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Abstract
This paper is about technology choices in a differentiated oligopoly. The main questions
are: whether the position in the product space affects the choice of technology, how changes
in fixed costs affect price outcomes, the strategic responses to policy interventions. The
industry is an oligopoly where a central firm is competing with two peripheral (or marginal)
ones. The former is shown to be more ready than the latter to adopt a technology with
low marginal costs and high fixed costs (Increasing Returns to Scale) rather than one with
the opposite pattern (Constant Returns to Scale). The fixed cost in the IRS affects the
technology configuration and hence output prices. For instance, a lower fixed cost may
trigger lower prices and it is neutral only for given technologies. A price-cap may forestall
a change in technologies; nondiscriminatory ad-valorem tax and taxes on variable input,
or discriminatory unit taxes can also affect the technology pattern and deliver important
effects on prices.
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1
Non-technical summary
In a wide range of industries, competing firms adopt different tech-
nologies. Two explanations of this penomenon have been prompted
by the economic literature. On the one hand, technological asymme-
tries are related to the evolutive process of technological diffusion, on
the other hand they are a direct consequence of the strategic behav-
ior of firms. In this article we take the second stance and analyze how
firms select their productive technology when they produce differen-
tiated products. In particular, we are interested in (i) unveiling the
linkages between the location of firms in the product space and their
technological choices, (ii) analyzing the effects of these choices on
the price level in the industry and (iii) assessing the effects of some
commonly implemented policy instruments in this setup. Our results
(i) describe how changes in the characteristics of the technologies
affect the choices of firms, (ii) show that these choices are conse-
quential regarding the price level in the industry and (iii) suggest that
the possibility to modify the operating technology may increase or
decrease the effectiveness of commonly used policy instruments.
2
1 Introduction
In a wide range of industries competing firms adopt different technologies. One reason is that
firms discover and adopt new technologies at different timing, as empirically documented as
early as Griliches (1957); Dunne (1994); Doms et al. (1995). This heterogeneity has received
various explanations. Two main branches in the economics literature can be identified:1
one is related to the diffusion of new technologies; in a pure evolutionary view, asymmetric
choices are ”transitory” from the single firm viewpoint but permanent in the evolution of an
economic system (e.g. Dosi, 1997 and the literature cited therein); in Growth Theory the main
contribution comes from ”vintage capital” models originated from the work of Johansen (1959)
(most related to the issue is Jovanovic (1998); see also Boucekkine et al. (2011) for a survey).
A second branch, to which this paper refers, takes an Industrial Organization approach.
According to this view, technologies differences across firms arise as a natural by-product
of strategic choices, like in Salant and Shaffer (1999), and more recently in Krysiak (2008),
where the policy implications of asymmetric choices are emphasized.2 This approach does
not deal with the issue of why obsolete technologies persist, but rather focuses on asymmetric
equilibrium choices. To be precise, cost and technology asymmetries of two main types have
been analyzed: the first is with higher versus lower average (and total) costs, namely superior
versus inferior technologies (e.g. Bester and Petrakis, 1996, and more recently Amir et al.,
2011); the second is with cost functions that cross at a single point, so that one technology is
more efficient at low and the other at high output levels. This second type of asymmetry is the
only one considered in this paper. Several works in various context adopt a similar approach
(Mills and Smith, 1996; Wauthy and Zenou, 2000; Elberfeld, 2003; Go¨tz, 2005; Hansen and
Nielsen, 2010). It has also been argued that cost asymmetries are used by firms to strategically
manipulate their cost structures (Van Long and Soubeyran, 2001) or help less efficient rivals
in order to achieve higher profits (Ishida et al., 2011). Also, the choice of flexible versus rigid
technologies in terms of adaptability to demand has been analyzed in Goyal and Netessine
(2007). Bustos (2011) adopts a definition of the technology set that is similar to ours, in a
model of international trade where however strategic interaction is absent.
With respect to the literature, we introduce a (endogenous) relation between the tech-
nology choice and the position in the product space; we also aim at uncovering the long-run
policy implications of technology choices. We set our main focus on the following issues: (i)
how and if the technology choice depends upon the position of a firm in the product space;
(ii) what is the impact of exogenous changes, and more specifically of shocks on either fixed
1We do not refer here to the rich literature in Management which also offers important contributions, see
for instance McEvily and Zaheer (1999)
2On similar grounds, Fe´vrier and Linnemer (2004) study the effects of exogenous asymmetric shifts in
marginal costs in Cournot oligopolies.
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or marginal costs, on equilibrium technologies and prices; (iii) how are technology choices
affected by policy interventions. Regarding the first question, we distinguish two types of
firms: a ”central” one and two ”peripheral” or ”marginal” firms. These roles naturally follow
by placing the three firms respectively at the center and at the two extremes of a Hotelling
”linear city” model. The position of a firm will affect its equilibrium market share, with
marginal firms normally enjoying a lower share. Since firms are competing in prices and since
prices are strategic complements, a higher marginal cost of rivals benefits a firm in terms of
market share and profits and in turn affects its decision about which technology to choose.
This interdependence is at the heart of our analysis.
The choice set for each firm in our model is composed of two alternatives: a technology
exhibiting constant returns to scale (CRS) and one with increasing returns to scale (IRS).
Technologies are chosen at the first stage of the game and at the second stage price competition
is resolved. The IRS technology implies a positive fixed cost and no marginal cost, while
the CRS displays a zero fixed cost and a positive marginal cost - more generally the lower
marginal or fixed cost could be positive instead of zero as far as the differences are preserved.
The central firm is naturally endowed with a larger market share if technologies are the same
for all firms and has a higher convenience to adopt a technology exhibiting increasing returns
to scale. Indeed there is no equilibrium in which the central firm adopts the CRS except
for the equilibrium where all firms do - obviously when the fixed cost in the IRS is too high
with respect to the marginal cost in the CRS. It is also interesting that a peripheral firm only
adopts the IRS technology if the central firm also does so. In the range of possible asymmetric
equilibria, interestingly, there is a parameter region where the two peripheral firms choose the
same technology (a CRS) and a region where they choose different technologies.3
The increase in fixed costs in switching to the IRS technology takes an important role and
the usual irrelevance of fixed costs in determining prices in oligopoly does not hold in this
context. An exogenous change in fixed costs of the IRS technology may lead to changes in the
technology configuration, with consequences on the output prices, contrary to what happens
in short-run models where technologies are given exogenously. For example a decrease in the
fixed cost associated to the IRS technology may lead to additional firm(s) adopting it, with
a lower price for all firms, due to prices being strategic complements. For similar reasons, an
increase in the marginal cost implied by the CRS technology may lead to a change favouring
the IRS one and a reduction in prices. The degree of competitiveness in the market, as indexed
by the reciprocal of the transportation cost, also affects the equilibrium outcome, with an
increase in competitiveness making it more likely that firms choose asymmetric technologies
rather than symmetric ones.
3This confirms the intuition that firms with higher variable costs than those of the competitors are often
associated with niche-products, although we do not venture here in giving a cause-effect ordering to the
association; this would imply a full analysis of the location choice game.
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The price distribution will be with symmetric prices only if technologies are symmetric,
otherwise the prices will differ across firms.
It is then natural to analyze the effects of some policy actions by the Government. A price
cap, limiting the possibility to adjust the price upward may deter the switch from an IRS to a
CRS technology by one firm, when this would be done in the absence of a cap. This is a further
limitation to the profit seeking behavior by regulated firms, beyond the simple impediment to
raise price. Taxes and subsidies also may change the technology choices as far as they change
one or the other cost (fixed or marginal). As for non-discriminatory taxes, namely affecting
all firms independent of their technology, we find that while a nondiscriminatory unit tax
never changes the equilibrium choices, a nondiscriminatory ad-valorem tax does so in some
regions of the parameter space. Discriminatory taxes, aimed to discourage the adoption of
a specific technology and that therefore are applied only to firms adopting it, may change
the equilibrium configuration. Finally, a tax on a variable input works in the same way as a
discriminatory tax and increases the attractiveness of the IRS technology; hence a tax, say,
on a polluting variable input reduces the output of the firms that are using this input more
intensively and can trigger the adoption of the alternative IRS technology.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our model. In Section
3 we first find the possible equilibrium configurations as functions of the cost parameters,
showing that not all possible configurations may arise as Nash equilibria, then we analyze
some consequences of changes in costs that may alter the equilibrium configurations, as well
as the effect of an increase in the competitiveness of the market (a reduction in product
differentiation). In Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 we the analyze the effects of some frequently used
policies like a price cap, a unit tax or subsidy on output, an ad-valorem tax, a tax or a subsidy
on an input. Finally, in the concluding Section 8 we summarize our findings and add some
comments.
2 Model
We consider a Hotelling ”linear city” with uniform distribution of a mass M = 1 of consumers
over the interval [0, 1] which represents the product space. We assume linear transportation
costs t(x − xi) where xi is the location of firm i in the unit interval and x the location of
a consumer. Consumers are uniformly distributed. There are three firms with exogenous
locations x1 = 0, x2 = 1/2, x3 = 1. The extreme location firms take the role of ”peripheral”.
4
Two cost functions are available to the firms. The first one is characterized by very low
(zero) fixed costs and positive marginal costs, thereby displaying constant returns-to-scale
4Endogenous locations in a 3-firms Hotelling model are not obvious and are studied in De Palma et al.
(1987).
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(CRS) and is such that Cc(qi) = cqi, c > 0. The second has positive fixed costs and very low
(zero) marginal costs, thereby displaying increasing returns-to-scale (IRS) and is such that
Cf (qi) = f, f > 0, the two cost functions cross at q = f/c.
Since the indifferent consumers are x12 =
1
4 +
p2−p1
2t (indifferent between firms 1 and 2)
and x23 =
3
4 − p2−p32t (indifferent between firms 2 and 3), the demand system is given by the
following equations:
q1(p1, p2) =1/4 + (p2 − p1) /(2t)
q2(p1, p2, p3) =1/2 + (p1 + p3 − 2p2) /(2t)
q3(p2, p3) = 1/4 + (p2 − p3)/(2t)
(1)
It is apparent that the demand to the central firm at symmetric prices, has a higher
intercept and a higher own price elasticity than that of those for the peripheral firms, while
the cross elasticities are symmetric.
Given the technologies adopted in the industry, each firm i ∈ {1, 2, 3} maximizes its profit
pii(pi,p−i, τ) = qi(pi,p−i)pi − Cτ (qi), where qi is as in (1), τ ∈ {c, f} and p−i is the (vector
of) the rivals’ prices.
Then, the best reply functions are implicitly characterized by the following condition for
i = 1, 2, 3 (arguments omitted)
pi = C
′
τq
′
i −
qi
q′i
. (2)
If firms had different marginal costs their best replies would write as
pi = (t+ 2ci)/4 + p2/2, for i ∈ {1, 3} ,
p2 = (t+ 2c2) /4 + (p1 + p3) /2.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The firms play a two-stage game, at the first stage they simultaneously choose which technol-
ogy to adopt, at the second they simultaneously set their prices. Let the triplet 123 represent
the technology choices of firms 1,2,3 respectively, so that, for instance, cfc means that firms
1 and 3 select the CRS technology and firm 2 selects the IRS one. There are eight possible
technology configurations, namely fff, ffc, cff, fcf, fcc, ccf, cfc and ccc. Clearly, configu-
rations ffc and cff are equivalent to each other up to a permutation in the labels of the
marginal firms, and so are ccf and fcc. Hence we have in total only six possible non equivalent
configurations that are to be analyzed, namely fff, ffc, fcf, fcc, cfc and ccc.
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3.1 Price stage
The firms set their prices simultaneously; hereafter we report the optimal prices, and the
relative quantities sold and profits reaped by the firms according to the technologies chosen
at the first stage.
(i) Symmetric Configuration fff
Simultaneously solving the system defined by (2), with τ = f for i = 1, 2, 3 we get
symmetric prices,
pfffi = t/2 (3)
which lead to quantities qfff1 = q
fff
3 = 1/4 and q
fff
2 = 1/2, with profits
pifff1 = pi
fff
3 = t/8− f, pifff2 = t/4− f. (4)
Remark 1. In configuration fff , as long as f ≤ t/8, the profits of all firms are non negative.
(ii) Configuration cff
Simultaneously solving the system defined by (2), with τ = c for i = 1 and τ = f for
i = 2, 3 we get the three prices
pcff1 = (1/2) (7c+ 6t)/6, p
cff
2 = (c+ 3t)/6, p
cff
3 = (1/2) (c+ 6t)/6, (5)
which lead to quantities qcff1 = (1/4) (6t−5c)/(6t), qcff2 = (c+ 3t) /(6t), and qcff3 = (1/4) (c+
6t)/(6t), finally resulting in the following profits,
picff1 =
(
1
8
)
(6t− 5c)2
36t
, picff2 =
(c+ 3t)2
36t
− f, picff3 =
(
1
8
)
(c+ 6t)2
36t
− f. (6)
Remark 2. In configuration cff , the quantity produced by firm 1 is non negative as long as
c ≤ 65 t, the profits firms 2 and 3 are non negative as long as f ≤
(
1
8t
) (
c+6t
6
)2
.
It is immediate to observe that, with an appropriate change of the indices, the outcomes
under this configuration are equivalent to those of the configuration ffc.
(iii) Configuration cfc
Simultaneously solving the system defined by (2), with τ = c for i = 1, 3 and τ = f for
i = 2, obtains symmetric prices for firms 1 and 3 and a lower price for firm 2 with:
pcfc1 = p
cfc
3 =
3t− 2c
6
+ c, pcfc2 =
3t+ 2c
6
, (7)
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which lead to the quantities qcfc1 = q
cfc
3 =
(
1
2
)
3t−2c
6t , and q
cfc
2 =
3t+2c
6t , resulting in the
following profits
picfc1 = pi
cfc
3 =
(
1
2
)
(3t− 2c)2
36t
, picfc2 =
(3t+ 2c)2
36t
− f. (8)
Remark 3. In configuration cfc, the quantities produced by firms 1 and 3 are non negative
as long as c ≤ 32 t, the profits firm 2 are non negative as long as f ≤ 1t
[
3t+2c
6
]2
.
(iv) Configuration fcc
The simultaneous solution of the system defined by equations (2), with τ = f for i = 1
and τ = c for i = 2, 3 returns
pfcc1 = (1/2) (5c+ 6t)/6, p
fcc
2 = (3t− c) /6 + c, pfcc3 = (1/2) (6t− c) /6 + c, (9)
leading to the quantities qfcc1 = (1/4) [(5c+ 6t) /(6t)] , q
fcc
2 = (3t− c) /(6t), and qfcc3 =
(1/4) [(6t− c)/(6t)] , resulting in the following profits:
pifcc1 =
(
1
8
)
(5c+ 6t)2
36t
− f, pifcc2 =
(3t− c)2
36t
, qfcc3 =
(
1
8
)
(6t− c)2
36t
. (10)
Remark 4. In configuration fcc, the quantities produced by all firm 1 is always positive, that
of firm 2 is positive for c < 3t and that of firm 3 is positive for c < 6t. The profits firm 1 are
non negative as long as f ≤ 18t
(
5c+6t
6
)2
.
With an appropriate change of the indices, the outcomes under this configuration are
equivalent to those of the configuration ccf .
(v) Configuration fcf
Proceeding as in the previous cases, with τ = f for i = 1, 3 and τ = c for i = 2 in the
system defined by (2), we obtain symmetric prices for firms 1 and 3 and a higher price for
firm 2, with
pfcf1 = p
fcf
3 = (2c+ 3t) /6, p
fcf
2 =
1
6
(4c+ 3t), (11)
the relative quantities are qfcf1 = q
fcf
3 = (2c+3t)/(12t), q
fcf
2 = (3t−2c)(6t), and the profits
are
pifcf1 = pi
fcf
3 =
(
1
2
)
(2c+ 3t)2
36t
− f, pifcf2 =
(3t− 2c)2
36t
. (12)
Remark 5. In configuration fcf , the quantity produced by firm 2 is positive as long as c < 3t2
and the profits of firms 1 and 3 are non negative as long as f ≤ (2c+3t)272t .
8
(vi) Symmetric Configuration ccc
Last, we consider the case where, in (2), τ = c for i = 1, 2, 3. The optimal prices are
symmetric,
pccci = c+ t/2, (13)
the relative quantities are qccc1 = q
ccc
3 = 1/4, and q
ccc
2 = 1/2, and the profits are
piccc1 = pi
ccc
3 =
t
8
, while piccc2 = t/4. (14)
In configuration ccc quantities and profits are always positive.
3.2 Technology choice stage
Firms simultaneously and costlessly adopt their technologies. In the following, we shall assume
Assumption 1 (A.1). c < (6/5)t and f < t(1/8).
Under the foregoing Assumption, all the possible technological candidate-equilibrium con-
figurations the quantities and profits of the firms are non-negative. Later in this Section we
will discuss how relaxing this assumption affects the equilibrium configurations. In Appendix
A we prove the following
Proposition 1. Under A.1, let F I ≡ 5c24t
(
t− 5c12
)
, F II ≡ 5c24t
(
t− c4
)
and F III ≡ c3t(t + c3),
where the ranking F I < F II < F III holds, then neither fcc (and ccf) nor fcf can be
equilibrium configurations, and
(i) for 0 < f < F I a unique equilibrium exists, at which the technology choices are fff ,
(ii) for F I < f < F II a unique (up to a permutation of the labels of the marginal firms)
equilibrium exists, at which the technology choices are cff (or ffc),
(iii) for F II < f < F III a unique equilibrium exists, at which the technology choices are cfc,
(iv) for F III < f a unique equilibrium exists, at which the technology choices are ccc.
It is useful to observe that under A.1 neither fcc (and ccf) nor fcf can be equilibrium
configurations. In fact, in the first case, either firm 1 wants to deviate (when f is “large”
relative to c) or firm 2 wants to deviate (when f is “small” relative to c). In the second case a
similar reasoning applies, but in this case, both marginal firms want to deviate to technology
c. Indeed a Corollary can be stated to highlight the differences between the central and
peripheral firms.
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Corollary 1. If the CRS technology is adopted by a single firm this is a peripheral one. If
the IRS technology is adopted by a single firm this is the central one.
To understand Proposition 1, start with a low level of f relative to c, like case (i) in
the Proposition. As is intuitive, all firms select the IRS technology, which allows to save on
variable costs. For larger values of f , however, the CRS technology becomes more attractive
and, eventually, only one of the marginal firms switches to this technology (case (ii)). It is
interesting to observe that in spite of their symmetry with respect to the central location, the
marginal firms make different choices in this region. Furthermore, the firm that switches to
the CRS technology increases its marginal cost and therefore optimal price. Because of the
strategic interaction the prices of firms 2 and 3 increase too. This price increase is beneficial
to 2 and 3, leading to an increase in their profits, both because they serve larger market shares
and enjoy increased mark-ups than they did before the change. The region for this situation
is with F ′ < F < F˜ ≡ c3 − c
2
9t . By contrast, in this region the profits of the switching firm are
decreased.
As f increases further (falling in case (iii) or cfc), the second peripheral firm also adopts
the CRS technology, while the central firm sticks to the IRS one. This is explained by the
larger market share of firm 2, due to its central location, which implies that this firm has a
”comparative advantage” in adopting the IRS technology. Finally, when f is very large, also
this firm abandons the IRS technology leading to the configuration ccc. Figure 1 graphically
represents the regions in Proposition 1, in particular Panel (1a) plots these regions as function
of the marginal (and average) cost c, for given t and Panel (1b) as a function of t for given c.
The foregoing Proposition has some immediate consequences stated in the following result.
Corollary 2. Fixed costs are consequential regarding the (long-run) price level in the industry.
Any increase (decrease) in f inducing a change in the technology equilibrium configuration
yields to a generalized though indirect effect in the price level.
Proof. Directly follows from the comparison of the prices set by firms in the different regions
identified in Proposition 1.
As an example of the price effect in the Corollary, suppose that the cost parameters
initially lead to the configuration ccc. In this situation the price is given by (13) for all firms,
namely p = c+ t/2. Suppose now that a decrease in f leads to the configuration cfc (because
f decreases from F III < f to F II < f < F III . The highest price is the common price of the
peripheral firms in (7), which is lower than the common price c + t/2 prevailing before the
change of technology by firm 2. Hence in this case the decrease in f brings forth a generalized
(namely for each individual firm) price decrease. This need not be always true, but more
generally one can state the following.
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t
8
ccc cfc cff /ffc
fff
F
c6t
5
(a) t = 1
t
F
F = t8
ccc
cfc
cff /ffc
fff
5c
6
(b) c = 1
Figure 1: Equilibrium technology choice.
Proposition 2. As f decreases from a level such that f > F III continuously, then at each
change in configuration there corresponds a lowering of the average price paid by the con-
sumers.
Proof. Let min{pcfc} (respectively max{pcfc}) denote the lowest (respectively, the highest)
price when the equilibrium configuration is cfc, and use similar notation for the other config-
urations. Then starting with f > F III , and letting f decrease continuously the equilibrium
changes from ccc to cfc, then from cfc to cff , and finally from cff to fff . Since the relation
min{pccc} > max{pcfc} holds and since min{pcff} > max{p(fff)} holds then the weighted
average price at which goods are sold decreases in the first and third change in configuration
triggered by a continuous decrease in f . The relation min{pcfc} = pcfc2 > max{pcff} = pcfc2
however does not hold true and one has to check that the average price decreases in the
change. Let p¯cfc = pcfc1 (q1 + q3) + p
cfc
2 q
cfc
2 and p¯
cff = pcff1 q
cff
1 + p
cff
2 q
cff
2 + p
cff
3 q
cff
3 Then it
is a mater of computation to show that p¯cfc − p¯cff = 148 ct (12t− c) which is positive for the
range of c, t values where c < 6t/5.
According to Proposition 2, holding c constant, the price of any firm is a function pi(f ; c) of
f , with the graph of a step function displaying positive upward ”jumps” at the critical points
F I , F II , F III , the right-most interval taking value pi = (c + t)/2, for i = 1, 2, 3. Starting
from the left, the first interval corresponds to configuration fff , the second to cff , the third
to cfc, the fourth to ccc. Panel (2a) of Figure 2 provides a diagrammatical representation of
this point with reference to p2.
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(a) p2(f ; c)
c
p2
cˆ2 c˜2 C2
t
2
t
2
+ c
t
2
+
c
6
t
2
+
c
3
(b) p2(c; f)
Figure 2: p2 as a function of the parameters.
Any decrease in the fixed production cost makes the IRS technology relatively more at-
tractive than the CRS one and eventually, when the decrease is such that one of the region
boundaries identified in Proposition 1 is crossed, one firm abandons the CRS and switches
to the IRS technology. This has an immediate effect on the cost structure of the switching
firm, which experiences a decrease in the marginal production cost. This causes the price
reaction function of this firm to shift down and to the left. The rival firms react to the price
decrease by setting lower prices as well since prices are strategic complements - no change in
their reaction function occurs. Conversely, but for analogous reasons, an increase in a fixed
cost, which is usually assumed to be price-neutral, can generate an increase in the price level.
A mirror-image reasoning applies for an increase in the marginal production cost. In fact
it is easy to observe that the region boundaries F I , F II and F III are all increasing in c for
c < 6t5 . This entails that, for given f , an increase in the marginal production cost c just
above a threshold point can lead to a price reduction instead of a price increase. The relation
between marginal cost in the CRS and prices are non monotonic. To see this consider a
configuration where at least one firm is operating the CRS technology. For given f , assume
now that c increases. Clearly, if the shift is large enough, the IRS technology becomes a more
profitable choice for at least one firm that before the change was adopting the CRS technology.
For this firm the switch would imply a fall in its marginal cost (here a fall to zero) and a price
decrease by this firm, followed by a strategic price cut by the rivals. Hence we can state the
following result.
Corollary 3. The relations pi(c; f) linking the marginal cost, c, in the CRS and the equilib-
rium prices of firms i = 1, 2, 3 for a given value of f , are non monotonic; furthermore, in
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some intervals of the cost parameter c, an increase (decrease) in c triggering a change in the
technology equilibrium configuration, leads to a generalized reverse change in the prices of all
firms.
The general picture of the dependence of prices on marginal cost in the CRS is made more
clear by considering that, holding f constant, as c is let to vary the price of any one firm
is a function pi(c; f), that can be graphed as a piecewise linear function, displaying two flat
portions at the extreme left and right intervals, and a saw-like shape in the middle intervals,
with the intervals defining different technology configurations. Starting from the c = 0, the
first interval corresponds to configuration ccc, the second to cfc, the third to cff , the fourth
to fff . At each threshold level for c between one and the next interval, a discontinuity in
pi(c; f) occurs with a vertical drop in the downward direction. For instance, analyzing the
relation for firm 2, let cˆ2 =
3t
2
(√
4f+t
t − 1
)
be the critical level where piccc2 = pi
cfc
2 so that
when c raises above cˆ2 firm 2 switches from the CRS to the IRS technology. Let c˜2 the one
where picfc3 = pi
cff
3 , so that when c raises above c˜2 firm 3 switches from the CRS to the IRS
technology, cˆ2 < c˜2. The graph of p2(c; f), displays a linearly increasing portion over the
interval [0, cˆ) with p2 = p
ccc
2 = t/2 + c and a linearly increasing portion over the interval (cˆ, c˜)
with p2 = p
cfc
2 = t/2 + c/3, however it displays a downward vertical shift (of size (2/3)cˆ2), at
the point c = cˆ2.
5 Panel 2b of Figure 2 provides a diagrammatical representation.
Our last result in the equilibrium analysis concerns the role of t, the transportation cost,
which translates into the substitutability between products. A lower t increases substitutabil-
ity and hence the degree of competition in a Bertrand framework. The size of the regions for
f that lead to (fff) and to (ccc) decrease as t decreases; by contrast the size of region for
(ffc) or (cff) and that for (cfc) both increase. Hence we can state also the following result.
Corollary 4. Any increase in the competitiveness of the market (a decrease in t) decreases
the likelihood that the final configuration will be symmetric.
Before proceeding, for the sake of completeness we explore the implications for the equi-
librium technological configuration of the restriction in A.1, namely f < t8 and c <
6t
5 , which
are diagrammatically reported in Figure 3. As pointed out above, these two conditions insure
that at all candidate equilibrium technological configurations, the quantities and profits of all
firms are non-negative. Therefore, relaxing A.1 implies that the non-negativity of profits is
no longer guaranteed for the firms adopting the IRS technology, because the fixed production
5At this value there is a second downward drop (of size (1/6)c˜2). Then the price increases linearly over
the interval (c˜2, C2), where at C2 the profit equality pi
cff
1 = pi
fff
1 triggers the ”last” firm 1 to also embrace
the technology with IRS and the price of firm 2 drops to the constant value p2 = t/2. At c = C2 therefore
there is a third and final drop in p2 of size
1
6
C2. Over the interval (cˆ2, C2) the price of firm 2 takes a saw-
like shape, whence the non-monotonicity . A similar pattern–with different intermediate values and different
critical values–is displayed by p1 and p3.
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Figure 3: Technology equilibrium configurations with unrestricted parameter space.
cost may exceed the revenues of the firm. Similarly, the positivity of output (and thereby
of profits) of the firms running the CRS technology is no longer guaranteed either. Keeping
this in mind, if f > t8 , the profits of the firms under technological configuration fff become
negative, implying that each firm has an incentive to switch to the CRS technology, ultimately
entailing that fff can no longer be part of a SPNE, for any level of c.6 On the other hand, in
the case c > 6t5 the optimal quantity produced by a firm running the CRS technology equals
zero under some technological configurations. In particular, when c ∈ [6t5 , 3t2 ], this happens in
configurations cff and ffc, and when c > 3t2 this happens in configuration cfc too.
7 In the
remainder of the paper, we will stick to A.1.
4 Price-cap regulation
In the present framework, price-cap regulations may hamper upward price adjustments that
follow the adoption of the CRS technology by one or more firms. Therefore they may dis-
6To this regard, it is instructive to observe that the threshold F I equals t
8
for c = 6t
5
.
7A second consequence of relaxing the restrictions on the parameters is that for c > 6t
5
equilibrium multi-
plicity appears in a sub-region of the space F II < f < F III . In fact, within this region, fcf is part of a SPNE
for c
3
− c2
9t
< f < 5c
24
+ 5c
2
96t
and c > 36t
47
, together with cfc (the green-purple region of Figure 3 (see Appendix
A for the derivation of the conditions for the existence of the fcf equilibrium). Notice that, in this “new”
equilibrium configuration, the output of the CRS firm is nil for c > 3t
2
as well. In Figure 3 the darker regions
identify the parameter constellations where the output (and profit) of the firms running the CRS technology
are zero at equilibrium. A formal characterization of the technological equilibrium partition of the unrestricted
parameter space is available from the authors upon request.
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favor this technology. Otherwise stated, when the price cap is fixed below the highest price
prevailing under the unregulated equilibrium, the regulated equilibrium can entail a different
technology configuration than the unregulated one. In an industry where both technologies
do not change often this means that a new equilibrium under regulation will emerge and
persist for a medium-long period. In an industry where at least one of the two alternative
technologies experience an important shock, the price cap may lead to inability to readjust
by some or by all firms.
For instance, assume that the initial cost configuration is cfc and that marginal costs
decrease due to changes in labor productivity due to technical progress in the CRT technology,
or to decreases in the cost of raw materials. Assume this cost decrease to be important enough
to trigger a switch in an unregulated industry from the cfc to the ccc configuration, which
would trigger a generalized rise in prices. The firm that has to switch to the CRS technology
is the central one. However, if there is a price cap equal to the highest historically inherited
price, or anywhere below the unregulated equilibrium price pccc the technology change may
become unprofitable for the central firm.
The profit of the firms under a price cap, represented by the price p = z, when they all
adopt the CRS technology are pii(z, ccc) = (z − c)14 , for i = 1, 2, 3.
It is easy to check that, the switch to the CRS technology is not profitable for firm 2 as
long as
z < z¯ ≡ (2c+ 3t)
2
18t
+
3c
2
− 2f. (15)
It is a matter of calculations to ascertain that z¯ ∈ [pcfc1 , pccc1 ], namely the price cap thresh-
old for a profitable technological switch lies in between the unregulated and the maximum
inherited price, for c ∈ [0, .237t] and F < c (12 + c9t), or c ∈ [.237t, .337t].
A change from cff to cfc or from fff to ffc can be hampered by the same argument. As
a general point: a price cap may lead to favor the IRS technology and to alter the equilibrium
configuration. Since all the changes where at least one firm switches from the IRS to the
CRS technology lead to a price increase, the price cap may play a role in affecting the market
outcome even if it is not binding in equilibrium, the relevant equilibrium price being the one
that would prevail after the change - the change that however cannot happen.
5 Unit tax (subsidy) on output
5.1 Non-discriminatory unit tax (subsidy)
With a non-discriminatory unit tax (subsidy) θ > 0 (< 0) that affects all firms in the same
way, independent of the technology choice, the profits of the firms are pii(θ) = qi(pi,p−i)(pi−
θ)−Cτ (qi). It is a matter of easy calculations to ascertain that a unit tax (subsidy) affects all
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the best replies, in all possible configurations, symmetrically by shifting them by a factor θ/2.
This, together with market coverage which implies an inelastic aggregate demand, results
in a complete pass through of the tax, which generates a rise in all equilibrium prices, in
all configurations, by an amount equal to the tax, θ. The ultimate consequence is that the
candidate-equilibrium profits at each technological configurations do not change relative to
the no-tax case. Clearly, this also implies that the equilibrium technological choices under a
per-unit tax coincide with those reported in Proposition 1. We summarize this finding in the
following
Proposition 3. A nondiscriminatory per-unit tax (or subsidy) on output does not affect the
technological choices of the firms.
5.2 B. Discriminatory unit tax (subsidy)
The case of a discriminatory tax is also interesting. Assume first that the Government wants
to discourage the adoption of the technology using the variable input intensively. In this case
it may adopt a unit tax that only applies to the firms using the CRS technology. Obviously
this will change the technology choices only if the tax is high enough. As it will be clear from
what follows, in our model, such a tax is equivalent to a tax on the variable input, so that we
defer its analysis to the following section.
The case where the Government wants to encourage the adoption of the CRS technology
is different. In that case the tax should only affect the firms choosing the IRS technology.
Starting with the configuration cfc, for instance, this discriminatory tax will affect the market
structure when the tax is high enough to forestall the adoption by firm 2 to the IRS technology.
Similarly, the same effect can be induced by providing a discriminatory subsidy to the firms
adopting the CRS technology. One may think, as real life examples, to taxes-subsidies that
favor labor intensive technologies. For instance these technologies help preserving jobs, or
preserving the environment (like in fisheries), or both. The difference between a tax on the
IRS technology and a subsidy on the CRS one is that the first has a negative and the second
has a positive effect on consumer surplus, via the effect of equilibrium prices. Obviously a
subsidy must be financed. In theory one can define a lump-sum tax on profits of the firms and
finance the subsidy, in a way to change the equilibrium technology choice while preserving
budget balance for the Government. This is admittedly requiring quite a lot of information
on the part of the authorities.
Starting with the configuration cfc, the discriminatory tax θ on the IRS technology acts
as a marginal cost increase from zero to a positive level for firm 2. The threshold level for
θ that leads firm 2 to change its technology is defined by rewriting the equilibrium prices as
p1(θ) = p3(θ) =
3t+4c
6 +
θ
3 and p2(θ) =
3t+2c
6 +
2θ
3 . So that pi
cfc
2 (θ) =
1
36t (2c+ 3t− 2θ)− f , if
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firm 2 adopts the IRS technology. Then the threshold level of tax on the IRS technology is
the solution for θ of 136t (2c+ 3t− 2θ)2 − f = t4 .8
Likewise, one can find a threshold level for a subsidy s that triggers a change from, say,
cfc to ccc. A subsidy is equivalent to a decrease in cost c from c to c− s. This does not affect
profits in the ccc configuration, which remain equal to pi2 = t/4. However, prices in the cfc
configuration under a subsidy to the CRS technology become p1(s) = p2(s) =
3t+4(c−s)
6 , and
p2(s) =
3t+2(c−s)
6 . The corresponding profit to firm 2 is pi
cfc
2 (s) =
[3t+2(c−s)]2
36t − f. Hence the
threshold value for s is given by setting picfc2 (s) = t/4. This provides the same solution as for
τˆ . Hence a discriminatory tax and a discriminatory subsidy have the same magnitude and
opposite sign, but the first is enacted upon the IRS technology while the second on the CRS.
Proposition 4. A discriminatory subsidy to favor the CRS technology in the configuration
ccc, discourages the adoption of the IRS technology and may deliver a decrease in the average
price.
Therefore the subsidy eventually grants a double dividend as it achieves the desired tech-
nology target and also allows consumers to enjoy a higher surplus. A tax on the IRS does not
lower the prices in the ccc configuration and it only achieves the technology target.
6 Ad-valorem tax
An ad-valorem tax reduces the profits from both types of technology, because, in this case, the
profits accruing to the firms are pii(pi, p−i, t, v) = qi(pi, p−i)pi(1− v)−Ct(qi), where v ∈ [0, 1[
is the tax rate. An analysis analogue to the one of Section 3 can be carried out to obtain the
following.
Proposition 5. An ad-valorem tax on output can lead to a change in the technology config-
uration.
Proof. Assume that c < 6t(1−v)5 and let F
I
v ≡ 5c24 − 25c
2
288t(1−v) , F
II
v ≡ 5c24 − 5c
2
96t(1−v) and F
III
v =
c2
9t(1−v) +
c
3 , with F
I
v < F
II
v < F
III
v ∀t > 0, c > 0 and v ∈]0, 1[. Then the triplet (F I , F II , F III)
in Proposition 1 is replaced by the triplet (F Iv , F
II
v , F
III
v ).
The ad-valorem tax affects differently the profitability of each type of technology and,
consequently their equilibrium choices. In fact, by analyzing the effect of an increase in v on
the threshold values of proposition 5 it is easily obtained that
∂F Iv
∂v
= − (5c)
2
288t(1− v)2 ,
∂F IIv
∂v
= − 5c
2
96t(1− v)2 ,
∂F IIIv
∂v
=
c2
9t(1− v)2 . (16)
8Namely θˆ = c+ 3
2
t
(
1−
√
4f
t
+ 1
)
.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium technology choice (t = 3.5, c = .7).
It is a matter of easy algebra to ascertain that, ∂F
I
v
∂v <
∂F IIv
∂v < 0 and that
∂F IIIv
∂v > for all
admissible v. This implies that the region where “mixed configurations” arise at equilibrium
expands relative to the case where there is no tax, Figure 1 plots the threshold values F I , F II
and F III (panel (a)) and F Iv , F
II
v and F
III
v (panel (b)) as a function of the ad valorem tax
rate v. The following Corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 5. Any increase in the ad-valorem tax rate v reduces the likelihood that the final
technological configuration will be symmetric.
7 Unit tax on input
We imagine here that an input like labor, or fuel, can be subject to taxation. This kind of
taxation is obviously ubiquitous and has a higher impact on firms adopting the technologies
that use more intensively the variable input, like our CRS. It is then clear that the IRS
technology becomes relatively more attractive for all firms. The effects on technology adoption
are therefore quite straightforward and we shall not pursue the analysis in detail here. The
parameter regions where the CRS technology is adopted shrink and those where the IRS is
adopted become larger. If one thinks of the taxed input as a polluting one, like fuel, then the
tax may be also aiming at reducing emissions. In this case one can compute for the various
configurations in which at least one firm is adopting a CRS technology the tax level that leads
to a change in technology. As an example, consider the pre-tax equilibrium to be ccc. Then
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there is a tax level on input, φ′, that causes the central firm 2 to abandon the use of the CRS
technology (in our parametrization this also leads to zero utilization of the taxed input). The
marginal cost in the CRS technology after the tax φ per unit of input is introduced becomes
c + φ. If all firms adopt the CRS technology the price is pi = t/2 + c + φ and no change in
profits occur, piccc2 = t/4. A switch to the IRS technology for firm 2 becomes profitable when
piccc2 < pi
cfc
2 , or
t
4 <
(3t+2c+2φ)2
36t − f . The threshold tax triggering the change from ccc to cfc
is therefore
φ′ =
3
2
(√
4f + t
t
− 1
)
t− c.
When the central firm operates the switch to the IRS technology, the price it sets is subject
to two opposite effects: it is reduced due to the reduction in its own marginal cost and is
increased thanks to the increase in the marginal cost of the other two firms. The average price
level can therefore go up or down and the policy can eventually be designed so as to deliver
a price decrease. Intuitively, when the tax rate on fuel, say, is increased from a preexisting
level close to φ′ to a level slightly above it, then the average price is going to be lowered as
the price complementarity pushes down the prices of the peripheral firms.
It is interesting that the consumption of the taxed input is reduced whether or not a
change in technology occurs, so that the aim of the tax is achieved. A change in technology, if
it occurs, reinforces the effectiveness of the policy, by inducing a discontinuity in the amount
of input in the production function of the switching firm(s).
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the relation between the relative positioning in a market, with
a central versus two peripheral firms, and the choice of technologies. We have in particular
discussed the strategic choice of adopting a technology that is more efficient at low output
levels or one that is more efficient at high output levels. The equilibrium configurations reveal
that the central firm adopts the CRS technology (with high marginal costs and low fixed costs)
only if all its rivals do the same. Furthermore, exogenous shocks to technologies, that change
ther cost structure, lead to nonobvious changes in the equilibrium prices. Imagine to start
with a high fixed cost in the IRS technology and with a low marginal cost in the CRS one,
so that all firms adopt this second technology. Let the fixed cost decrease: the central firm
is the first one to embrace the IRS technology; then as the fixed cost decreases further only
one of the peripheral firms adopts it, and finally all firms do. Hence, fixed costs contribute in
shaping the market outcome and determine the price configuration. A decrease in the fixed
cost leading to a firm switching from the CRS to the IRS technology, induces a generalized
price reduction. This long-run effect contrasts with the short-run irrelevance of fixed costs.
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Then we also find that asymmetric results are more likely as competition intensifies (as
the transportation cost is reduced).
The analysis of the equilibrium responses to some widely used policies reveal various
interesting points. A price cap may reduce the convenience to adopt a CRS technology,
thereby preventing a price increase. A nondiscriminatory unit tax on output has no effect
but a nondiscriminatory ad-valorem tax has the same effect as an increase in the degree of
competitiveness. A discriminatory tax (subsidy) on output that applies only to firms adopting
one of the two technologies can discourage the adoption of the taxed technology and encourage
that of the technology which is subsidized. The effects on prices can deliver a double dividend
if the policy instrument is a subsidy, with consumers also benefiting due to lower equilibrium
prices. Finally a tax on a variable input may induce a change in technology from CRS to
IRS,namely to the technology making less use of it) and induce a lower utilization of the taxed
input. From the perspective of a taxation on an input that damages the environment, this
taxation if properly designed may also grant a double dividend: it decreases the utilization of
the undesirable input and it lowers prices to consumers.
We have left several questions for further research: one could analyze the incentives and
the means by which a firm can increase the rivals’ fixed costs. Note indeed that if a firm
switches from the IRS to the CRS technology it creates a positive externality to rivals due to
the price complementarity: they will enjoy higher market shares and higher mark-ups after
the change. If it were possible, therefore, a firm would like to encourage the adoption of the
CRS technology by the rivals, e.g. by making the IRS proprietary, or by raising the rivals’
fixed costs if they adopt the IRS (as in Hviid and Olczak, 2016). Finally, if the central firm is
a firm producing the input that is used in the CRS technology and selling it to the rivals then
it would choose the wholesale price so as to manipulate the technology choice by the rivals,
namely so as to strategically avoid a change in technology from the CRS to the IRS.
A Proof of Proposition 1
(i) To prove the existence of configuration fff we need to check that neither one peripheral
firm nor the central firm have incentives to deviate to the CRS technology.
No deviation by peripheral firm.
If firm 1 unilaterally deviates to the CRS technology it reaps a profit equal to picff1 , this
is not profitable if
pifff1 ≥ picff1 ⇔ f ≤
5c
24
− 25c
2
288t
. (17)
Clearly, this same condition guarantees that firm 3 does not want to deviate to the CRS
technology too.
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No deviation by central firm.
There is no profitable deviation to the CRS technology by the central firm when
pifff2 ≥ pifcf1 ⇔ f ≤
c
3
− c
2
9t
. (18)
It is easy to prove that both conditions are fulfilled when f ≤ 5c24 − 25c
2
288t ≡ F I and that
F I < t9∀c <
6t
5
, which insures the positivity of the SPNE profits.
(ii) Existence of a SPNE with technological configuration cff or ffc requires the following
(here we focus on case cff , which, after an appropriate permutation of the firm labels
guarantees existence for configuration ffc).
No deviation by firm 1.
This requires that
picff1 ≥ pifff1 ⇔ f ≥
5c
24
− 25c
2
288t
. (19)
No deviation by firm 2.
This requires that
picff2 ≥ piccf2 ⇔ f ≤
c
3
. (20)
No deviation by firm 3.
This requires that
picff3 ≥ picfc3 ⇔ f ≤
5c
24
− 5c
2
96t
. (21)
The three above conditions are simultaneously satisfied for F I = 5c24 − 25c
2
288t ≤ f ≤
5c
24 − 5c
2
96t = F
II . It is easy to ascertain that, in this region, the profits of the firms
running the IRS technology are positive.
(iii) Existence of an equilibrium with configuration cfc requires what follows.
No deviation by peripheral firm.
For firm 1, this requires that
picfc1 ≥ piffc1 ⇔ f ≥
5c
24
− 5c
2
96t
, (22)
this same condition insures that firm 3 has no profitable deviation either.
No deviation by central firm.
This requires that
picfc2 ≥ piccc2 ⇔ f ≤
c
3
+
c2
9t
, (23)
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these conditions are simultaneously fulfilled when F II = 5c24 − 5c
2
96t ≤ f ≤ c3 + c
2
9t = F
III .
As before, straightforward calculations prove that the profit of the firm adopting the
IRS technology is positive within this parameter space.
(iv) Existence of configuration ccc at equilibrium requires the following.
No deviation by peripheral firm.
piccc1 ≥ pifcc1 ⇔ f ≥
25c2
288t
+
5c
24t
, (24)
the same condition guarantees no deviation by firm 3.
No deviation by central firm.
piccc2 ≥ picfc2 ⇔ f ≥
c
3
+
5c2
9t
, (25)
The two above conditions are simultaneously satisfied when f ≥ c3 + 5c
2
9t = F
III .
To complete the proof of Proposition 1 there remains to demonstrate that no equilibrium
exists under the configurations fcf , ccf and fcc.
1. Equilibrium under configuration fcf requires that, simultaneously
pifcf1 = pi
fcf
3 ≥ piccf1 = pifcc3 ⇔ f ≤
5c
24
+
5c2
96
, and pifcf2 ≥ pifff2 ⇔ f ≥
c
3
− c
2
9t
. (26)
It is a matter of simple algebra to ascertain that the two conditions above cannot be
simultaneously fulfilled under the assumption f < t8 .
2. Equilibrium in configuration fcc requires
pifcc1 ≥ piccc1 ⇔ f ≤
5c
24
+
25c2
288t
, pifcc2 ≥ piffc2 ⇔ f ≥
c
3
, and pifcc3 ≥ pifcf3 ⇔ f ≥
5c
24
+
5c2
96t
.
(27)
As in the previous case, the tree conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied for c < 6t5 .
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